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Chalmers’s Master Argument and Type Bb Physicalism
A. I’m very impressed by Chalmers’s ‘master argument’ against the PCS. Though I don’t think it works in the end, I have to say.
B. PCS? You’ll have to slow down—what’s ‘PCS’?
A. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy? You know, Loar and Papineau and co., they’re all using it to try to defang the zombie argument and protect their physicalism.
B. Ah ok, the zombie argument; that’s something I do know about: the notion of a physically duplicate human being without consciousness—a zombie—seems to be logically coherent, and this, some modern Cartesians say, shows that physicalism is false.
A. Right. More generally, there’s the explanatory gap one apparently finds between the physical and the phenomenal: no matter how much physical detail we go into about the mind, we seem unable to explain the presence of consciousness, or—which is more or less equivalent—to see why our physical structure guarantees that we phenomenally experience. That’s why zombies are conceivable.
B. Well that does seem a prima facie problem for physicalists doesn’t it? If their story about what exists doesn’t provide for the presence of human consciousness, that’s a big omission by anyone’s lights.
A. So the Cartesians think. That’s where PCS comes in. These physicalists—Chalmers calls them ‘Type B’ physicalists—they try to account for the explanatory gap in physicalist terms...
B. What, to explain consciousness physically? But that’s not Chalmers’s Type B if I recall; that’s the position of his Type A physicalists: those who think the explanatory gap can be closed, that zombies are inconceivable at the rational limit, even if they might seem conceivable to some people, now. You’re getting the labels mixed up.
A. You cut me off. I was about to explain that those physicalists who deploy PCS agree that zombies are conceivable at the rational limit, and accept the existence of the explanatory gap; they concede that the gap cannot be closed by us. What PCS adds to their position is meant to be a physicalistically acceptable explanation of why there is an explanatory gap. These physicalists figure that if they can account in physical terms for why we face an explanatory gap, then the gap ceases to be a threat to physicalism.
B. I think I see. The idea is to give a physicalist diagnosis of the explanatory gap, to show why we must face one given the physical structure we have. Right? If the physicalist account predicts an explanatory gap, then that gap can’t be used against physicalism. It no longer appears to be an uncomfortable datum.
A. Precisely.
B. PCS would be a very smart move then, if it could be pulled off. How does it work?
A. There are many variants, but the core idea is this: Posit a conceptual disconnect, specifically between our phenomenal and physical concepts, one that means there are no a priori entailments between the two sets of concepts, and you’ll have explained why the explanatory gap obtains. 
B. Because, tell any physical story you like, it will never conceptually guarantee that any phenomenal story must accompany it? So then we’ll be able to conceive of zombies etc....
A. That’s it. Of course, this explanation of the explanatory gap must itself be physicalistically acceptable. 
B. So...?
A. Well that means the PCS-physicalist...wait, that’s a mouthful. I’m going to refer to these physicalists as ‘Type B’s’ from now on for ease. It’s a little broad-brush, but you’ll know what I mean.
B. Fine. Continue.
A. Well these Type B’s, to pay due regard to their physicalism, must stipulate that the mechanism responsible for the aforementioned conceptual disconnect, that’s an entirely physical mechanism. In practice, as Chalmers puts it, they allege the existence of a certain cognitive condition C in human beings. This cognitive condition underlies the strange behaviour of our phenomenal and physical concepts—i.e. their lack of proper interaction—and in turn accounts for the explanatory gap. Our psycho-physical setup, in effect, allows us to think impossible thoughts, like when we imagine zombies.
B. That sounds to me a not entirely unfeasible, if somewhat inelegant, way to safeguard physicalism.
A. I’m quite taken with PCS, personally. Anything that reminds us of the gap between epistemology and metaphysics, that’s good by me. If the world is an inelegant place, that’s just how we find it.
B. So then, Chalmers’s master argument...
A. Ah, yes. Now that, I must admit, is an elegant piece of reasoning. You see, Chalmers poses a quite general dilemma for PCS. We said PCS had to do two things, remember: it had to make sense of our epistemic situation, the fact that we face an explanatory gap—label this, our epistemic situation, E, following Chalmers again—and on the other hand PCS had to give a physicalistically acceptable explanation of why we are in E. 
Chalmers claims that it is impossible for PCS to do both these things: it will, so he argues, either fail itself to be physically explicable, thus simply creating a new explanatory gap, or else, if it takes a form that is physically explicable, it will inevitably fail to explain E.
B. Hang on...so he thinks PCS will either fail to explain E, or will itself be physically inexplicable?
A. I put it the other way round, but yes, on the nose. 
B. I’d love to hear how he reaches that conclusion.
A. Yes, I’ll see if I can do him justice. Let’s split things up. First: why does Chalmers think PCS threatens a new explanatory gap?
B. You tell me!
A. I’m about to. You’ll like the next bit, as Chalmers uses zombies to explain the whole thing. Is it conceivable, he asks, that a zombie—a physically duplicate human being—could lack C, which was, if you remember...
B. Yes, yes: the physical ground in us of the strange behaviour of our phenomenal concepts.
A. ...Right. So, could a zombie conceivably lack C, Chalmers asks.
B. Well, say the answer is ‘yes’...
A. Then C must be physically inexplicable, it follows. 
B. How does that follow?
A. You’ve got to bear in mind the equivalence Chalmers sees between matters of explanation and matters of entailment—I referred to it briefly earlier, but I suppose now is the time to say a bit more. Essentially, for Chalmers, explanations entail their explananda. If some explanatory story accounts for the obtaining of a particular feature, then the truth of that story will entail that the feature obtains. In explaining the feature, the story suffices for it to be in place.
B. Yes, that seems intuitive I suppose, in its somewhat bare bones.
A. Well if you grant that, and assert that it’s conceivable for a zombie to lack C...
B. I see—then it can’t be the case that a physical account of C can be given. For if it could, then zombies—our physical duplicates—couldn’t be imagined to lack C.
A. I do wish you’d stop cutting me off, but yes, you’ve got it. 
B. Sorry. I can’t promise not to do it again, though.
A. Anyway, there you have it: if zombies can lack C, then C is not physically explicable. And if C isn’t physically explicable it’s of no use to Type B’s. Even if C accounts for the presence of the explanatory gap, on this hypothesis, that would be at the cost of spawning its own explanatory gap: namely, the physical mystery of how we have condition C, and the accompanying conceivability of C-zombies—physical duplicate humans lacking C. All in all, no progress.
B. That’s clever, I agree. But it also seems remarkably easy to escape. What right minded Type B would swap one explanatory gap for another? The obvious thing—obvious from the start I must say—is to deny that zombies can conceivably lack C. Of course our physical duplicates must share the cognitive condition that causes the conceptual disconnect between the physical and the phenomenal. So, so far I don’t see the big deal over Chalmers’s argument.
A. That’s because I’m not finished explaining it yet. Hold on! You’ve only heard Chalmers’s first horn. So, now, you assert that zombies must have C, because C has to be physically explicable?
B. Yes. That’s elementary.
A. Now we get to the really clever part of Chalmers’s argument! I don’t like the argument, but still I’m almost rubbing my hands in glee!
B. You can’t wait to see what it does to puncture my smugness?
A. Yes indeed! Let’s say, then, that our physical duplicates must be conceived of as having C, even if they’re not conceived of as sharing phenomenal consciousness with us—they’re still zombies, after all. But then, says Chalmers, C must fail to explain E.
B. This I already know. You’re supposed to tell me how this part of the argument goes.
A. ...The reason is this: if C explained E, then, given again that an explanation entails its explanandum, it would follow that zombies must share E with us. Zombies would have to be in exactly the epistemic situation we are in, facing their own version of the explanatory gap. But, says Chalmers, zombies cannot be in the same epistemic situation as us. Hence, C cannot explain E. Q.E.D.
B. Too fast for me!
A. Ok. You recall the explanation/entailment equivalence?
B. Yes of course.
A. So, suppose that C did explain E. Then the possession of C by a creature would entail the possession of E by that creature. Now, on this horn of the dilemma—Chalmers’s horn b as it happens—you’ve chosen to say that zombies must be conceived of as having C. To say otherwise was to allow that C was physically inexplicable remember—that was horn a, as Chalmers labels them. But if zombies must have C, and C explains, so entails, E, why then, zombies must also have E. But since they cannot, as a matter of fact, share our epistemic situation, our original supposition must be false: C does not in fact explain E.
B. Right. I’m with you up to when you say that zombies can’t have E. The physical story about a zombie entails that the zombie has C, which, if it explains E, in turn entails that the zombie also has E. But why does Chalmers say zombies can’t share our epistemic situation?
A. That’s simple, at least so Chalmers thinks. Zombies are zombies; but we aren’t zombies, so they can’t be epistemically the same as us. In a nutshell.
B. Surely he says a bit more than that!
A. Perhaps the nutshell was unduly small. Chalmers’s reasoning is this: Part of our epistemic situation is that certain of our beliefs—that we are conscious, for example, plus beliefs held by each one of us about the quality of her consciousness—are true. For, ex hypothesi, we are conscious, and are usually correct about the states of consciousness we are in. But the analogues of these phenomenal beliefs are, as entertained by our zombie twins, quite false. Your zombie twin is not correct in believing he is conscious, or that he feels irked at finding his position crumbling.
B. I don’t feel irked either, because I’m not, as you know, a fan of Type B physicalism. So I don’t mind if Chalmers’s argument works out. So much the better for proper forms of physicalism, I say. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this discussion, I concede that my zombie twin has some false beliefs where I have true ones—e.g. ‘I am conscious’. So, I also concede, I suppose—for the sake of argument—that my zombie twin and I cannot share epistemic situation. I’m in E, he is not.
A. Quite. So, to rehearse: You’ve taken horn b—you said avoiding horn a, the physical inexplicability of C, was an ‘obvious’ move—on which you agree that a zombie must be conceived of as having C. Now, if C explains E then, on the explanation/entailment equivalence, your zombie twin shares E with you. But he does not share E with you, on account of the fact that his phenomenal beliefs differ in truth value from yours. Ergo, the antecedent of the preceding conditional was false: C does not explain E.
B. ‘Antecedent of the preceding conditional’. Don’t get carried away! I have it, I think. C—the hypothesised physical ground of the physical/phenomenal conceptual disconnect, either create a new explanatory gap, or, if it is physically explicable, fails to distinguish us from zombies. It predicts that zombies have E, when in truth they cannot have E. So C is physically inexplicable or fails to explain the explanatory gap.
A. Brilliant argument isn’t it!
B. Yes, you seem rather taken with it. But, ahem, you started by saying you thought Chalmers’s argument didn’t work...don’t tell me rehearsing it has made you re-think your Type B physicalism!
A. No way. It’s just that, you know, one gets caught up in an argument. Especially when...
B. Especially when explaining it to someone with whom you like to disagree.
A. That’s right! But no, I don’t buy Chalmers’s argument. It seems to me that Type B’s can easily accommodate horn b of Chalmers’s dilemma, I really can’t see that it’s a serious problem for them. Us. 
B. Explain.
A. I think one can consistently maintain that C really does explain E, while making sense of the fact that zombies can’t conceivably share E with us.
B. But if C explains E, then zombies will have E, given that on horn b they must have C. I can’t see how this is going to work.
A. I’m trying to explain, if you’ll be so kind. Perhaps the best thing is to introduce an alien thinker into our discussion. Alf, the cerebrally advanced alien, is able to grasp, through his study of human cognitive architecture, how C does in fact entail E, just as Type B’s hypothesise. Some physically explicable feature of our cognitive setup is indeed responsible for the conceptual disconnect underlying the explanatory gap. So now it can be maintained that C does suffice for explaining E.
B. If that’s true, then zombies must have E. But they don’t. So this gets nowhere.
A. No, that’s not quite right. When we conceive of them, our physical duplicates are bound to lack E, of course. We must bear in mind the Type B hypothesis: that C is the ground of the odd interaction of our physical and phenomenal concepts. Now, given that hypothesis, on which we instantiate C, we will, it follows, always be able to conceive of our physical duplicates as lacking consciousness. And in so doing, we create, in our conception of our duplicates, the conditions in which they must be conceived—by us—as differing from us with regard to epistemic situation. For, just as our possession of C is responsible for our withholding consciousness from our imagined physical duplicates, just so we must insist that the beings we imagine differ from us epistemically—they have false analogues of our true phenomenal beliefs. 
B. And what about alien Alf? 
A. He doesn’t have C, this I stipulate. Not having C, Alf is not forced to conceive of our physical duplicates as lacking consciousness. So he is not forced, in his conceivings, to attribute, on that account, a different epistemic situation to our duplicates than the one we enjoy. In effect, he can see, where we cannot, how C explains E. It is our possessing C that precisely stops us seeing this. C, as an epistemic condition, is self-obscuring, we might say. Those who suffer under it cannot grasp its physical workings.
B. Because it is C that causes those thinkers who have it to conceive of physical twins who lack consciousness. On that basis C causes any conscious thinker possessing it to think that his physical—zombie—twin will differ as to E. And this is so even if C in fact entails E? Is that right?
A. Yes, exactly.
B. But what sense can you give to the claim that ‘C in fact entails E’?
A. This: a thinker without C is not obstructed from grasping the way that C puts E in place. Because E is in fact caused by C. It is our being under the influence of C that prevents this making sense to us: For any putative account of E in terms of C, we will always have the feeling that it doesn’t suffice for E, since our very having C will mean we needn’t attribute consciousness—and a fortiori E—to the beings we imagine in the story. The story of E in terms of C will always lack, for us, for that reason, the pleasing necessity that accompanies a good explanation. Even if we hit upon the correct account, it will seem to fail to entail E. 
B. It’s slowly materialising for me. But then, what sense can you give to the claim that ‘zombies lack E’? Do zombies have E or not?
A. If C is physically explicable—embracing horn b—and really does account for E—this, I should say, is nothing new or clever, it’s just the Type B hypothesis re-stated—then yes, zombies have E. 
B. But they can’t! They’re zombies, we’re not! How can they be in the same epistemic situation as us?
A. You’ve got to keep hold of the fact that we’re always working under a conceivability operator here...we’re always talking in terms of what is conceivable, and for whom. So, to be clear: when we imagine our physical duplicates, our possession of C allows us to conceive of them as zombies, hence to conceive of them as lacking E also. That’s when we do the conceiving. 
B. Right, with you so far.
A. Now consider Alf’s conceivings. Alf, good for him, doesn’t have C. So when he conceives of physical duplicate human beings—plain human beings in other words—he is not caused to conceive of them as ‘P but not-Q’—as sharing our physiology while lacking our phenomenality. So, on the Type B’s’ hypothesis that C accounts for E, there’s nothing in the way of Alf understanding that a human being—given the physical structure it has—will have E. The story Alf understands will be that of a certain conceptual disconnect caused in the creatures under study—us—by their instantiating a special cognitive condition: C. Perhaps C will be one of the mechanisms posited by Type B’s hitherto—say Papineau’s quotational structure for phenomenal concepts—, or another mechanism they’ve not hit upon yet.
B. So...what you’re saying is that zombies really do have E, that it’s just some kind of illusion when we think they cannot have E?
A. Right. Though what that comes to is actually just the claim that a being physically structured like a human will have E. 
B. That’s absurd.  
A. It can’t be absurd; that’s just the original Type B hypothesis!
B. Right, the hypothesis that Chalmers shows is incoherent. Look, what you’re really saying is that zombies are inconceivable, I believe. 
A. I don’t see that.
B. If I’m remembering correctly, the whole reason why zombies can’t have E—as we imagine them, whatever—is that they lack consciousness:—Q, from now on.
A. Correct.
B. If you’re saying that our physical duplicates do in fact share E, it follows that they do in fact share Q as well. In other words they are conscious: not zombies. But since it is the Type B position that zombies are conceivable, what you propose is abandoning the Type B position. Exactly what Chalmers wants you to do!
A. Hmm. Let me think. 
B. Think away!
A. I’m not sure that follows. You’re saying there’s an entailment from E to Q, that if a being is in E, it must be in Q.
B. Yes.
A. But wait. E is not itself a phenomenal fact; it’s the fact of our being in a certain epistemic predicament where our concepts don’t knit up properly. There’s no reason why Alf’s ascertaining that our physical duplicates must have E will lead him to infer that they must have Q, not at all. What Alf will see—deduce from our cognitive structure—is a certain isolation between two of our sets of concepts. That’s enough for him to understand that we—and our physical duplicates—instantiate E. That’s just what E is, on the Type B hypothesis.
B. You said earlier that if a being lacked Q it couldn’t have E!
A. But that’s a sloppy way of putting matters. What I said—following Chalmers—was that if a creature is conceived of as lacking consciousness, then it can’t be conceived of as having E. I’ll put it more formally. When one conceives of a zombie one conceives of ‘P but not-Q’, where P is the physical story about a human being. In that case, one cannot, in addition, ascribe E to the zombie. But Alf doesn’t conceive of ‘P but not-Q’. Alf is missing C, as I said. And that means he doesn’t have our phenomenal concepts ‘Q’; C is the ground of those concepts, so say Type B’s. The most Alf conceives of, then, is ‘P and C’. And on the Type B hypothesis that C explains E, Alf will therefore see that ‘If C then E’. Hence, the physical duplicate humans he imagines will have E. There’s an entailment from not-Q to not-E, I maintain, but not one from E to Q.
B. Now I’ve got you! That would violate the rule of the contrapositive! Want to re-write logic to get Type B’s off the hook do you? 
A. Sorry,...I...er...
B. Look, entailment is just necessary implication, right? Then ‘Nec(If not-Q then not-E)’ is equivalent to ‘Nec(not-not-Q or not-E)’, hence to ‘Nec(not-E or Q)’, which is equivalent to
‘Nec(If E then Q)’, or ‘E entails Q’. Whoops-a-daisy!
A. Yes, I can see it would be an error to deny the contrapositive. I shouldn’t have said that. Ok, so there must in fact be an entailment from E to Q, I concede...
B. ...So you concede the argument?
A. Not so fast! Of course beings that have P, and so C, and so E, also have Q: they’re just us! I don’t need to remind you that Type B’s are physicalists, and so maintain that zombies are, in truth, impossible.
B. But that wasn’t the problem, the problem was Alf: if E entails Q, as you concede, then in deducing that our physical duplicates have E, Alf will be able to further deduce that they have Q, in other words that they’re not zombies. I was right before: you’re in effect denying the genuine conceivability of zombies; this isn’t Type B at all that you’re proposing, but Type A. No one’s stopping you from shifting to Type A to evade Chalmers’s master argument, but that’s a victory for Chalmers: he wants to show that only Type A is remotely viable. 
A. I see the way out now. We’ve got to keep separate the level of what’s conceivable from the level of what’s metaphysically possible, just as Kripke long ago recommended. Alf is no problem, once we’re careful about this. Alf, as I said, lacks C, and for that reason also lacks ‘Q’—our phenomenal concepts. So Alf will not deduce Q from attributing E to our physical duplicates. He just doesn’t have any thoughts involving Q, or not-Q for that matter.
B. But you concede then that these are no longer zombies Alf imagines; you’ve given up on the conceivability of zombies.
A. Not a bit of it! According to Chalmers, zombies are conceivable in the following sense: given a thinker with ‘P’ and ‘Q’—our conceptual setup, in other words—ideal rational reflection cannot rule out ‘P but not-Q’. That remains true on my proposal. Alf doesn’t falsify it because he lacks ‘Q’—not Q, though, he is conscious I hope!—so he cannot rule out ‘P but not-Q’. He never gets near that thought.
B. Fine, leave Alf aside. Some superior alien thinker will be able to join the dots between P and Q, this implies. 
A. Again, my account caters for that. If a thinker has ‘Q’, it follows that they have C, from the Type B hypothesis that C is the ground of ‘Q’.
B. Ok...
A. But, again on the Type B hypothesis, C causes a conceptual disconnect between ‘Q’ and ‘P ’ within a thinker’s cognitive system.
B. ...right.
A. Thus, any creature with phenomenal concepts like ours will suffer the conceptual disconnect. No such being will be able to rule out ‘P but not-Q’ on reflection, no matter how powerful a reasoner he is. So zombies remain fully conceivable, in Chalmers’s sense.
B. ...
A. I’m quite pleased with this: I’m going to dub this position Type Bb physicalism: for Type B physicalists who embrace Chalmers’s horn b as I recommend. 
B. It’s slippery alright, but I still have the feeling that everything doesn’t add up. Give me a moment.
A. Think away!
B. Now you’re invoking Chalmers’s account of conceivability—more rope to hang you with. I think you’re saying that humans have some kind of cognitive limitation—are you not—that gets in the way of us understanding how P gives rise to Q. After all, you have to maintain that P does give rise to Q, because you’re a physicalist. 
However, Chalmers is quite clear that his notion of conceivability—ideal conceivability—idealises away from cognitive limitations. So if you’re saying that we cannot connect P and Q due to a cognitive limitation, you’re conceding that zombies are inconceivable on idealised rational reflection, i.e. without cognitive limitation. But then zombies are inconceivable simpliciter, and this, again, is not Type B physicalism.
A. Good move. But what I describe is not a cognitive limitation at all: it’s not a limit on intelligence, or processing power or suchlike. The disconnect between ‘P’ and ‘Q’ is conceptual: there are not a priori entailment relations between the concept types. That is the result of C, a feature of our cognitive setup. But, I repeat, the limitation on us is not cognitive. Take a creature, however smart, cognitively powerful and so on, that has ‘P’ and ‘Q’—and therefore C—this creature will always be able to conceive of ‘P but not-Q’, so Type B’s theorise. I say that makes ‘P but not-Q’ ideally conceivable at the rational limit. Even Chalmers’s ideal conceivability is defined relative to conceivers. There’s nothing irrational about thinkers who find zombies conceivable, says the Type B—and Bb—it’s just a fact of our conceptual endowment. We can think the impossible. Again, reality and thought are divergent.
B. B’s and Bb’s? What are the Bb’s again?
A. Bb’s hold roughly three things, in addition to the basic physicalist claim that zombies are metaphysically impossible:
1. ‘P but not-Q’ is a priori coherent: for any being with those concepts, it can’t be ruled out on rational reflection.
2. ‘C but not-E’ is a priori coherent for any being possessing ‘Q’—this means they suffer from C.
3. ‘C but not-E’ can be ruled out by a being not afflicted with C. This does not involve the being inferring the phenomenal from the physical, since it lacks Q, through lacking C.
B. It’s really just a subvariety of Type B physicalism.
A. Hence the name! Bb’s are Type B’s who embrace Chalmers’s horn b. C explains E and it’s no problem. C just can’t explain E for those conceptually like us. Type Bb is a way of preserving the original Type B insight and motivation: that thought is not a perfect guide to metaphysics, especially not human thought.
B. It’s ugly.
A. Some things are.
B. Problem: ‘C but not-E’ cannot be ruled out by us, but it can by Alf. But then ‘C but not-E’ is not really a priori coherent, in the final analysis. Now, Chalmers’s Type A’s can happily accept that there are certain thinkers who cannot rule out zombies: as long as zombies can be ruled out by some thinker, they are not genuinely conceivable. So, since the Type B position you offer is consistent with Type A, when these positions are defined in opposition to one another, you have again failed to defend a distinctive Type B position. Type Bb isn’t Type B, in the end. Chalmers wins.
A. On the contrary, Type Bb is distinctly Type B. For Bb’s insist that zombies cannot be ruled out a priori. Either a thinker possesses ‘Q’, in which case he will have C, and will be unable to connect the physical and the phenomenal. Or he lacks C, and so ‘Q’, in which case he cannot rule out ‘P but notQ’. Thus Bb’s oppose the defining Type A claim: that zombies are inconceivable at the rational limit. 
B. Maddening! Why can’t we acquire Alf’s concepts, in addition to our own? We learn new languages don’t we? If we could, then we could likewise rule out ‘C but not-E’. 
A. It’s not Alf’s possession of any extra concepts that helps him to see that C entails E, it’s his not possessing C that allows him to do this. The Type B thesis is that we, contingently, suffer a certain conceptual condition that makes the impossible conceivable for us. It doesn’t damage that thesis to note that if we could iron out that conceptual kink then ‘C but not-E’ would be unthinkable.
B. But then you grant that ‘C but not-E’ isn’t really a priori coherent, whereas above—your Bb thesis 2—you claimed that it was.
A. I think this might reduce to a terminological issue. What the Type B and Type Bb must maintain is that ‘P but not-Q’ is a priori coherent, in the full sense in which Chalmers understands that claim. I’ve already explained how that is achieved on my position. As for ‘C but not-E’: the job there is to explain how it seems to us that C doesn’t entail E, when in fact it does. Again, this is something I have done. If you maintain that Alf’s ability to rule out ‘C but not-E’ means that ‘C but not-E’ is not genuinely a priori coherent for us, I can’t stop you. But I needn’t stop you either: as long as zombies remain conceivable everything is in its right place; all that needs explaining when it comes to C and E is how C can appear to fail to entail E, however you want to classify the coherence for us of that thought in our conceivings.
B. I want to go back to Alf: imagine that Alf writes out the proof of why C entails E. Then he somehow gains our phenomenal concepts ‘Q’, along with, I’ll grant, C—the physiological ground of those concepts. Perhaps he has an operation to make his cognitive structure more similar to ours, so obsessed is he with matters human. According to your account, this should mean that Alf ceases to be able to understand his proof! But why should the acquisition of new concepts cause him to be unable to follow the proof? You can’t reply that C confuses him, because that sounds like a cognitive deficit, not a conceptual one.
A. Again, a most resourceful objection. I—and other Type B’s—claim that cognitive condition C causes a conceptual disconnect in creatures that have it, a disconnect between their physical and phenomenal concepts. In hypothesising that Alf gains C, you’re just hypothesising that this same conceptual disconnect comes to afflict him, according to our theory. So of course I’m bound to say that Alf will now fail to be able to understand his proof: his account of the workings of C will seem to him to fail to entail E, in just the same way that any account we attempt of C appears to us not to entail E. One can lose understanding through conceptual change, as well as gain it; I see nothing problematic in that.
B. I’m sure there is something wrong with this Bb idea somewhere along the line.
A. It’s been pretty resilient so far. I can only commend it to wider scrutiny, like any idea. 
—It doesn’t seem to me that Chalmers has demonstrated any incoherence within the Type B position, when this is refined to the Type Bb position.

Bibliography
The discussants drew upon their knowledge of the following texts, which may be of use to the reader in making up his own mind about the points discussed:
Chalmers, D. (2007). ‘Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap’. In Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, ed. T. Alter and S. Walter. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
— (2002). Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? In Conceivability and Possibility, ed. T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 145–200.

Levine, J. (1983). ‘Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap’. In Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:354–61. 
Loar, B. (1997). ‘Phenomenal States – Revised Version’. In The Nature of Consciousness, ed. N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere: 597–616. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.
Papineau, D. (2002). Thinking about Consciousness. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Stoljar, D. (2005). ‘Physicalism and phenomenal concepts’. In Mind and Language 20:469-494.














12



